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ALLIED SHIPPING CONTROL. AN EXPERIMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION. By J. A. Salter. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1921. pp. xxiii, 372.

"If an adequate history of the war is ever written it will probably give as much space to the economic as to the purely military struggle. It was as much a war of competing blockades, the surface and the submarine, as of competing armies. Behind these two blockades the economic systems of the two opposing groups of countries were engaged in a deadly struggle for existence, and at several periods of the war the pressure of starvation seemed likely to achieve an issue beyond the settlement of either the entrenched armies or the immobilized navies."

No one was more qualified to write a great chapter of the history of this economic struggle than the author of the present volume. When, in the months following the Armistice, guessing the name of the single individual who, barring Tommy Atkins, did most toward winning the war became one of the favorite, absurdly arrogant after-dinner amusements in England, there was surprising unanimity among diverse people "on the inside" in suggesting an obscure civil servant named Salter. It is feared that, despite his authorship of this fascinating book, the achievement of Mr. J. A. Salter will continue to remain caviar to the general. He speaks with intimate knowledge of a great experiment and yet he has accomplished an amazing feat in depersonalizing his account. In this book, Mr. Salter describes the work of the Allied Maritime Transport Council (the A. M. T. C.) and thereby describes the Allied control of shipping as an indispensable instrument of eventual Allied victory in the "war of competing blockades." Mr. Salter's creative powers largely contributed to the execution of the supply programs of the Allies and to the administration of the allotment of neutral tonnage during the most critical period of the war. But the tradition of the English Civil Service breathes through this book, and Mr. Salter's recital is a scrupulously scientific study. Unlike many more famous men, he did not scale world events down to the measure of his own humble personality. Mr. Salter's book is one to be read, and not to be read about. His story is too significant to be summarized, its details too massive to be mutilated.

But what's Hecuba to me? the lawyer will say, alert to take a jurisdictional point even in the realm of the mind. A scientific study of Allied control of shipping during the war may be important to the economist, and of general interest to the historian of the war, but what particular appeal does Mr. Salter's book make to the lawyer? The answer is furnished by Mr. Salter's sub-title, "An Experiment in International Administration." Mr. Salter makes the story of the A. M. T. C. a vehicle of inquiry into the circumstances which brought it into being, the scope of its operations, the principles which conditioned its success, all with a view of determining whether or not this extraordinarily successful piece of administration contains germs of permanent utility for the purposes of peace no less than the temporary uses of war.

So far as we are familiar with the English literature on the subject Mr. Salter has made the most fertilizing contribution to the problem of international administration. His thinking is muscular. He does not minimize difficulties, and avoids the foggy analogies which glide so cheerily from problems of war to problems of peace. In an admirable chapter on the difference between the war and peace problem (pp. 243-248) Mr. Salter clearly indicates the special conditions which war presents and the differences in available motive power. He concludes, however, that the basic theory upon which effective international administration, as illustrated by the A. M. T. C., succeeded during war may be utilized for the problems of peace. Indeed no other principle has any promise of success. The principle invoked was that of direct

contact between specialists. The most essential economic control of the Allies (shipping was the key to Allied success, but it was also at the core of Allied conflicts) was secured not by delegation of national authority into the hands of some economic generalissimo or even an international board with delegated authority; Allied control was secured by knitting together the representatives of the various nations through agreement of aims and by the common possession of all the facts necessary for translating those aims into action:

"The crucial development of the Allied organization was the extension of the principle of direct contact throughout the national controls, the formation of a machinery through which contact was regularly effected, and the linking up of the whole system by the continuous work of the staff of the big Councils and particularly the Transport Council.

"We have seen how Allied Program Committees, ultimately twenty in number, covered the whole range of imported commodities, and (in addition to their non-shipping duties) prepared programs of the shipping required for submission to the Transport Council through the transport executive. The members of these Committees were essentially national officers who met in conference or in constant association, for international work. In their own departments they represented the international point of view; in Allied meetings they represented the national point of view. And the agreement they arrived at in Allied discussion they carried into practice through their national departments. Thus the new Allied principle did not override or replace the national organizations — it penetrated them. It linked them together from inside. The Allied authority consisted of the national authorities themselves associated for a common purpose influenced by a common point of view and securing results through the executive action of the national system." (pp. 250, 251.)

"Thus the international machine was not an external organization based on delegated authority; it was a national organization linked together for international work and themselves forming the instrument of that work." (p. 252.)

The underlying thought, it is evident, was the systematic effort to contract the area of conflict and passion and to widen the area of accredited, and therefore accepted, knowledge as the basis of action. The application of this main thought to the adjustment of competing interests, such as were involved in shipping control during the war, gives rise to a body of main rules which were hammered out on the anvil of experience. They are formulated with great clarity by Mr. Salter and their pertinency to the problem of peace is unmistakable. (pp. 257-259.)

Mr. Salter's analysis of the ultimate problem of international coöperation for peace inevitably makes pertinent the experience of the particular experiment in international administration with which he was concerned. "What after all," he asks, "is the ultimate problem of international government?" It is, we may suggest, "the administrative division of the world in relation to the inevitable and constant change in the relative strength and development of different nations. . . . Any real hope of successful machinery being devised probably depends upon whether it is possible to drain some of their contents from the passions behind national feeling; and here the crucial point is whether it is possible to isolate questions of commercial interest and advantage and eliminate national feeling from them." (p. 270.)

From this point of view Mr. Salter approaches the problem of the League of Nations and luminously sketches his conception of the function of the League, namely, "not that of controlling the world from a new center of power, but of affording a new opportunity to the nations of the world to work out their new policy in coöperation. . . . It is a method by which the official policies of all countries can be penetrated by the influence of other countries, and, beyond that by the influence of the public opinion of the world. It is a method

by which simultaneously that world public opinion can itself be not only mobilized when it exists, but formed and educated. (pp. 276-277.)

"The central organization of the League will not be a center of controlling power, but an instrument to coördinate activity which is world-wide in its influence and in its effects. No organization which attempts to dominate can conceivably dominate within anything but the most limited scope and range. But an organization which is content with the more modest rôle of assisting the nations to govern themselves in coöperation may permeate and gradually transform the whole policy of the world. . . . This means, however, neither pessimism nor a narrow ambition for its work. One may hope by the gradual and careful extension of this organization, and these methods, to arrive at a time when no Minister and no official in any center of power in the world will frame his policy or carry out his daily executive work without a real consciousness of its reactions upon other countries and responsiveness to their claims." (pp. 279-280.)

Unwittingly Mr. Salter has written an eloquent book — the eloquence of lucidity, insight, hardy thinking, in seeking to evolve orderly processes for adjustment of the most complicated affairs, affairs enmeshed in passions and sentiment and obscured all too frequently by ignorance of the controlling facts. Mr. Salter is preoccupied with problems of international administration, but the controlling ideas which he brings to their solution have still great conquests to make in our national life. At bottom the working ideas which Mr. Salter derived from his experience in international administration are direct representation of the affected interests, continuity of contact among these representatives, an available and steadily increasing, because continuously developing, fund of scientific data, and an accommodation of the competing interests in the light of these authoritative facts instead of partisan presentation or assumption about facts. By such process, in the course of time, Law is evolved. The applicability of this process to many of our economic and industrial problems and its imperative demand, if we are to have civilized solutions, need not be labored.

FELIX FRANKFURTER.